The Battle of Cynoscephalae

The Battle of Cynoscephalae, fought in 197 BC, was a decisive engagement between the Roman Republic and the Macedonian Kingdom during the Second Macedonian War. The battle took place in Thessaly, Greece, on the Cynoscephalae Hills. The Roman forces, led by Titus Quinctius Flamininus, faced the Macedonian army, commanded by Philip V. This clash marked a pivotal moment in history, showcasing the superiority of the Roman legionary system over the Macedonian phalanx formation. The Roman victory significantly diminished Macedonian power and influence, paving the way for Roman dominance in the Hellenistic world.

Great Battle of Cynoscephalae

Introduction

Other than a scattering of Greek colonies, the poorer, less civilized western Mediterranean had not been much of a concern for the Hellenistic kingdoms of the 3rd century B.C., but by its end, a new power had arisen in the west. These were the Romans, who had slowly spread from their city beside the Tiber to conquer most of Italy. They had then fought two bitter wars against their rival, Carthage, to emerge as the dominant force in the western Mediterranean. Now these upstarts were showing an inclination to spread into the eastern part of the sea.

Background to Cynoscephalae

• (1) In the autumn of 197 B.C., two armies representing two very different military systems engaged in a battle that would determine which of those systems was superior, with far-reaching consequences for world history. One of these armies was led by King Philip V of Macedon. The second was a Roman one commanded by Titus Quinctius Flamininus.
• (2) The Romans had enjoyed success against their mostly barbarian foes in the west, but now they were encountering the highly skilled, professional, and experienced armies of the east. Because the two forces were almost exactly the same size, the battle constituted an important showdown between rival military styles and systems, with nothing less than the domination of the entire Mediterranean at stake.

The Opponents

• (1) From the foundation of Rome in 753 B.C. until the Punic Wars about 500 years later, the Roman military was not noticeably better than its opponents in terms of training, professionalism, or equipment. In fact, it had suffered a number of defeats at the hands of various enemies: (a) After breaking away from Etruscan dominance, Rome was sacked by Gauls in 390 B.C.
  (b) In 321 B.C., the Romans were beaten and ritually humiliated by the Samnites at the Battle of the Caudine Forks.
  (c) In the 280s, the Greek mercenary general Pyrrhus destroyed two Roman armies.
  (d) Finally, in the Punic Wars, the Romans lost several successive fleets and were out-generaled and defeated no fewer than three times in Italy itself by the Carthaginian military genius Hannibal. Rome’s darkest hour came at the Battle of Cannae, when, in one afternoon, Hannibal obliterated two entire Roman armies, killing between 60,000 and 80,000 men.
• (2) Yet Rome usually ended up winning wars. The key to the Romans’ early success was a dogged determination never to give up, no matter what the cost, coupled with vast reserves of manpower drawn from the Italian cities they had conquered and given citizenship. These manpower reserves repeatedly enabled the Romans to keep fighting and wear down their opponents.
• (3) The Romans learned from their enemies, as well. They adopted weapons and tactics that took the best from each foe: for example, the short sword of the hill tribes of Spain, which evolved into the gladius and became an immediately recognizable symbol of Roman imperialism and military might.
• (4) In its weapons, tactics, and organization, the army of Philip V of Macedonia was a direct descendant of the army commanded by Alexander the Great. At Alexander’s death, his empire had split into near-constant fighting among rival kingdoms with each using Alexander’s style of warfare. These Hellenistic kingdoms were powerful and wealthy, and collectively, they controlled the richer, more urban, and more culturally sophisticated eastern half of the Mediterranean.

Roman and Macedonian Forces and Technology

• (1) By the time of Cynoscephalae, a new Roman army, with better weapons, better tactics, and more training, was in place. In its earliest phase, it probably fought in something like the phalanx used by the Greeks, but by the late 4th century B.C., it had begun to use a system sometimes called the manipular army.
• (2) In this system, the army was drawn up in subunits called maniples, blocks of 120 men arranged into three lines on the battlefield, in a chessboard-like formation.
  (a) Those on the first line, the hastati, wore a helmet and had a large oblong or rectangular shield called a scutum. They were armed with javelins and the gladius. The second line, the principes, were similarly equipped. The third line, the triarii, had longer thrusting spears and may have been composed of older men.
  (b) There were also groups of lightly armed skirmishers called velites and a contingent of cavalry.
  (c) In combat, the maniples used a loose formation that allowed soldiers in the back ranks to come forward and replace those in the front row, thus keeping fresh those actually engaged in the fighting.
• (3) A major advantage was the way the army was subdivided into units of steadily decreasing size. Roman soldiers and officers were trained to fight and maneuver in any of these size increments, and soldiers were trained to quickly shift the direction of the fighting. This made for maximum flexibility in battle, in direct contrast with the massive Hellenistic phalanx, which, while powerful when lumbering forward for a direct assault, was slow and could not easily be subdivided or redirected.
• (4) The heart of Philip’s Macedonian army was its phalanx, composed of a block of 15,000 men armed, just like Alexander’s phalanx, with the long sarissa. They were supported by about 10,000 cavalry, missile troops, and skirmishers.

The Generals

• (1) Philip V was an able and experienced general and politician, sometimes likened to Alexander. By the time of the Battle of Cynoscephalae, he had held the throne for more than 20 years and was well regarded as a leader. He had led a number of successful military campaigns, extending the borders of his empire into the islands of the Aegean, and had skillfully attempted to create a coalition of states to oppose the growing power of Rome.
• (2) Titus Quinctius Flamininus also had considerable military experience before Cynoscephalae and had distinguished himself as a junior officer in the Roman army during the second Punic War.
  (a) One distinguishing feature of Flamininus was that, for a Roman, he was unusually infatuated with Greek culture. He spoke fluent Greek and was an avid collector of Greek art.
  (b) This proved useful when fighting Philip because Flamininus was able to persuade a number of Greek states to join him by presenting himself as the savior of Greece, who would free it from Macedonian control.

The Battle

• (1) Cynoscephalae represented much more than a clash between Rome and the Hellenistic kingdoms of the east. It was a battle between two different types of military systems. The two sides were almost exactly evenly matched at about 25,000 men each; thus, the battle would be a good test of which system was superior.
• (2) The battle opened with some confused skirmishing between small detachments, indicating to both generals that their opponent’s main force was nearby. Flamininus accordingly deployed his army in the customary formation: the three rows of maniples screened by the velites. By choosing to move immediately into combat formation, Flamininus gained an advantage: He would begin the battle with his troops arranged exactly as he wanted them. On the other hand, deploying immediately meant that his men had to line up on the slope of one of the hills, thus yielding the advantage of the higher ground to Philip’s army.
• (3) By the time Flamininus’s men made contact with the enemy, the Macedonian phalanx had formed up and could add the momentum of a downhill charge to its already formidable strength. The Roman left could not resist the weight of this attack and began to give ground, retreating back down the slope. Even though they were being steadily pushed back, it was a fighiting retreat, and the Romans kept their formation and did not panic.
• (4) Flamininus had a few war elephants with him with which he opened gaps in the Macedonian lines—exactly the sort of weak points that the Roman manipular system was designed to exploit. Reeling from this assault, the Macedonian left began to run, pursued by the Romans.
• (5) This was the crucial point of the battle. A substantial gap now developed between the two halves of the respective formations, effectively splitting them into separate battles. The Romans were in the process of winning one side, and the Macedonians the other, with overall victory still up for grabs.
• (6) It was at this key moment that the flexibility of the Roman system showd its value. A junior Roman officer ordered a number of maniples from the right wing to break away, wheel 90 degrees to the left, and attack downhill against the rear right of the Macedonian phalanx that was threatening to overwhelm the Roman left. The effect was immediate. The men of the cumbersome Macedonian phalanx were unable to move to meet this new threat. Attacked from both the front and behind, the Macedonian right disintegrated, and the men were slaughtered as they attempted to run away.

Outcomes

• (1) Cynoscephalae ended the war. Following the victory, Flamininus announced that the Greeks were now free from Macedonian oppression. What the Greeks failed to realize was that the Romans now regarded them as their clients, and they had to do whatever Rome wanted.
• (2) For the moment, the Romans allowed Philip to retain his throne, but within two decades, another war broke out.
  (a) If there were any lingering doubts about the superiority of the Roman military system or any idea that the outcome of Cynoscephalae had been a fluke, the Battle of Pydna put them to rest in a Roman rematch against the Macedonian phalanx. Pydna was a head-on clash in the sort of environment in which the phalanx usually excelled, yet it crumbled.
  (b) What Cynoscephalae had shown and Pynda confirmed was that the well-disciplined, determined, and flexible Roman military machine was now qualitatively superior to most of its foes.

Conclusion

The Battle of Cynoscephalae was a turning point in ancient military history, highlighting the strengths of Roman military organization and heralding the beginning of Rome’s expansion into the eastern Mediterranean.

FAQ about the Battle of Cynoscephalae